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Abstract
A variant of the von Neumann-Wigner Interpretation is proposed. It does not make use of the familiar language of wave functions
and observers. Instead it pictures the state of the physical world as a vector in a Fock space and, therefore not, literally, a function
of any spacetime coordinates. And,  rather than  segregating consciousness into individual points of view (each carrying with  it  a
sense of its  proper time), this  model proposes only unitary states  of consciousness, Q(t),  where t  represents a  fiducial time with
respect to which both the state of the physical world and  the state of consciousness evolve. States in our world's Fock space are
classified as  either 'admissible'  (meaning they correspond to definite states  of consciousness) or 'inadmissible'  (meaning they do
not). The evolution of the state vector of the world is  such as  to always keep it restricted to 'admissible'  states.  Consciousness is
treated very much like what Chalmers calls an "M-Property." But we try to show that problems with the quantum Zeno effect do
not arise from this model.
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Introduction.
The relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics has long been discussed in a serious context.
Schrödinger (1), Wigner (2), and von Neumann (3) were, early on, most associated with these lines of investi-
gation.  And  Everett's  Relative  State  Interpretation  is  very  much  about  our  states  of  consciousness.  Still,  it
seems that little effort has gone into developing mathematical formalisms appropriate  to the description of this
relationship. Perhaps this is because  mental states seem to be mathematically indefinable. The von Neumann-
Wigner  idea  has  never  been  very  popular  with  physicists  who,  mostly,  hold  to  somewhat  Instrumentalist
views;  the  wave  function  collapses  because  macroscopic,  complicated,  things  like  detectors  cannot  exist  in
superposed  states.  How big macroscopic  things are,  or  how complex  something must  be  to  be  complicated,
are questions left largely to the imagination. 
Recognizing that  conscious  states  never  seem  to  exist in superposition,  Chalmers  (4)  has  introduced
the very clever idea of M-properties.  These properties cannot exist in superposition. He takes consciousness to
be such a property and assigns it an operator  (which we will designate M) that measures it and projects states–
he treats consciousness very much like an ordinary physical observable.  The present  work tries to extend this
idea  and  resolve  some  of  the  apparent  problems  it  engenders.  Particular  attention  is  given  to  the  quantum
Zeno effect.
States of the World.
Designate  the  state  of  the  physical world  as  |Y(t)>.  Such  states  are  to  be  understood  as  vectors  in  a  Fock
space.  Basis  vectors  in  this  space  are  constructed  from  the  vacuum  state  |0>  by the  repeated  application  of
creation  operators  appropriate  to  the  various  kinds  of  particles  that  inhabit  our  universe.  The  parameter  t
recognizes that this state evolves with respect  to a fiducial time that we can identify with a particular Lorentz
frame. It is essential to recognize that |Y(t)> is not a function of the spatial coordinates (x, y, z). We will work
in the Dirac Interaction Picture. Here we regard our Fock space as built using the creation operators  appropri -
ate to free, non-interacting particles and write ä ¶t È YHtL > = H ' È Y HtL > where H' is the Hamiltonian describ-
ing the interactions amongst these particles. The complete Hamiltonian for the system is written H = H0  + H'.
Every effort will be made not to express anything in terms of 'wave functions.' It has been recognized that this
concept  is  problematic  since  the  inception  of  quantum  field  theory  (5).  |Y(t)>,  in  fact,  describes  the  entire
world without making arbitrary distinctions between observers, detectors, and things detected.
Designate  the  state  of  the  physical world  as  |Y(t)>.  Such  states  are  to  be  understood  as  vectors  in  a  Fock
space.  Basis  vectors  in  this  space  are  constructed  from  the  vacuum  state  |0>  by the  repeated  application  of
creation  operators  appropriate  to  the  various  kinds  of  particles  that  inhabit  our  universe.  The  parameter  t
recognizes that this state evolves with respect  to a fiducial time that we can identify with a particular Lorentz
frame. It is essential to recognize that |Y(t)> is not a function of the spatial coordinates (x, y, z). We will work
in the Dirac Interaction Picture. Here we regard our Fock space as built using the creation operators  appropri -
ate to free, non-interacting particles and write ä ¶t È YHtL > = H ' È Y HtL > where H' is the Hamiltonian describ-
ing the interactions amongst these particles. The complete Hamiltonian for the system is written H = H0  + H'.
Every effort will be made not to express anything in terms of 'wave functions.' It has been recognized that this
concept  is  problematic  since  the  inception  of  quantum  field  theory  (5).  |Y(t)>,  in  fact,  describes  the  entire
world without making arbitrary distinctions between observers, detectors, and things detected.
States of Consciousness.
Suppose  that, at any time t,  the conscious state of the universe can be designated as Q HtL. Q HtL describes  the
qualia– the  totality of sensations experienced  by any and all consciousness  anywhere at  that time; that could
include physicists recording a quantum measurement  or worms tasting sugar in a pond on a distant planet. We
will try not  to  make  particular  distinctions between  various  "observers."   Proceeding  in analogy to  quantum
mechanics  we  suppose  that  there  are  'states  of  consciousness'  and  that  these  states  can  be  represented  as
vectors in our Fock space. There acts upon this space a non-linear 'consciousness pseudo-operator'–  C– which
has the property that, for some of these vectors,
 
1)    C |Ci> = Qi |Ci> .
The |Ci> constitute  something like eigenvectors  of C– they  correspond  to  what we will call definite  states  of
consciousness. By this we mean that Qi  specifies a unique and unambiguous  state of awareness possessed  by
the totality of  sentient observers.  Now it is immediately clear  what  a  strange sort  of  "operator"  C  is. We are
accustomed  to  seeing c-numbers  as  eigenvalues,  maybe a  few other  things, but  sensations? We assign C  no
explicit time dependence.  Any state that is not an eigenstate of C will be called a mixed state.  Definite states
of consciousness  are  admissible states in this theory. Mixed states are  inadmissible and cannot  be  allowed to
occur.  (By  writing  things  this  way  it  might  appear  that  we  regard  the Qi  and  |Ci>  as  constituting  discreet,
denumerably infinite sets. This is, of course,  not the case. Both are, properly, to be regarded  as continua as is
the set of inadmissible states. This notation is just simpler to work with.)
There  should  be  no  segregation  of  consciousness  into  any set  of  individual  observers.  We  will  just
designate it Q(t). This will prevent us from trying to describe the world in terms of separable and independent
"wave functions," one for your brain, my brain, or other things; it would be difficult having to make sense of
trillions of  independent  consciousness  operators.  While it  is  true  that  we  seem  to  experience  our  individual
conscious states independently, we have to argue that this apparent  separateness  is merely an illusion born of
facts like "I" can remember  my memories  but  not  "yours." And  "I" can experience  my sensation of  blue  but
not  "yours." These  facts are  indisputable,  and  surely interesting. But  they only obscure  matters  if we wish to
study the problem at hand. And we do not want to be misinterpreted as proposing anything mystical here. The
important  point  is  mathematical—we  will  regard  consciousness  (in  its  totality)  as  something  that  can  be
indexed by a single parameter t. (This also disposes of the Wigner's Friend paradox.)
If C is to be regarded  as any sort  of operator  at all (in the normal mathematical sense) we could well
encounter  difficulties.  Consider  <Ya|C|Yb>  supposing  that  Ya  and  Yb  are  eigenstates  of  C  corresponding  to
two  different  qualia  states  Qa and  Qb.  Imagine  C  to  be  Hermitian—like  a  normal  measurement  operator
should be.  Now,  unless qualia are strange and behave,  effectively, like zero,  we would  have to conclude  that
Ya  and Yb  must  be orthogonal.  This would  prove  fatal (vide infra).  We would  be much better  off denying C
the  status  of  any  kind  of  operator,  calling it  a  pseudo-operator  instead.  If  Ya  and  Yb  have  different  qualia
eigenvalues  we  can  say  little  about  their  linear  combinations.  Are  these  mixed  states?  Are  they eigenstates
corresponding to Qa  or Qb  or some completely different qualia state? Who knows? A very important point to
bear  in mind is that  two  state  vectors,  in this theory, do  not  have to  be  orthogonal  in order  to  correspond  to
completely different qualia eigenvalues. We will, somewhat  carelessly, use the terms 'eigenvector' and eigen-
space' in connection with C but it should never be thought that we mistake it for a real operator.
Regarding  the  nature  of  the  |Ci>s  one  thing  is  obvious;  they  are  highly degenerate  with  respect  to
the Qi. It would, for instance, make no difference to the overall state of consciousness whether an electron had
been  created  in a  region with no  observers.  And  we  must  recognize  a  sort  of  null state  of  consciousness—a
state  where  there  just  aren't  any sentient observers  at  all. (The  state  vector  a  few seconds  after  the big bang
would  correspond  to  such a state.  So would  many others.)  So we must  picture  our  Fock space  as broken  up
into  many  separate  subspaces,  some  with  a  particular  Qi  that  designates  the  unique  conscious  experience
corresponding to it, and others corresponding to no definite experience at all. 
The time variable that appears in |Y(t)> and Q(t) requires a comment.  As it pertains to the former case
it causes no problems with relativity since the equations that determine the evolution of |Y(t)> are, themselves,
relativistically invariant—t only represents  an arbitrary choice of Lorentz frame.  Q(t)  might cause  a problem,
however.  By  choosing  not  to  regard  consciousness  as  broken  up  into  separate  observers  (each  of  which
needing to be assigned its own proper  time) we have more-or-less  forced ourselves to select a particular set of
space-like  hypersurfaces  to  designate  the  various  't's.  Now  perhaps  because  consciousness  is  a  non-material
sort  of  thing  such  a  violation of  relativity is  permissible—we  can't  be  sure  how  physics treats  non-material
things.  But  it  is  essential  that  we  construe  Q(t)  in  such  a  way  as  to  end  up  with  no  physical  violations  of
relativity.
2  Consciousness18.nb
Suppose  that, at any time t,  the conscious state of the universe can be designated as Q HtL. Q HtL describes  the
qualia– the  totality of sensations experienced  by any and all consciousness  anywhere at  that time; that could
include physicists recording a quantum measurement  or worms tasting sugar in a pond on a distant planet. We
will try not  to  make  particular  distinctions between  various  "observers."   Proceeding  in analogy to  quantum
mechanics  we  suppose  that  there  are  'states  of  consciousness'  and  that  these  states  can  be  represented  as
vectors in our Fock space. There acts upon this space a non-linear 'consciousness pseudo-operator'–  C– which
has the property that, for some of these vectors,
 
1)    C |Ci> = Qi |Ci> .
The |Ci> constitute  something like eigenvectors  of C– they  correspond  to  what we will call definite  states  of
consciousness. By this we mean that Qi  specifies a unique and unambiguous  state of awareness possessed  by
the totality of  sentient observers.  Now it is immediately clear  what  a  strange sort  of  "operator"  C  is. We are
accustomed  to  seeing c-numbers  as  eigenvalues,  maybe a  few other  things, but  sensations? We assign C  no
explicit time dependence.  Any state that is not an eigenstate of C will be called a mixed state.  Definite states
of consciousness  are  admissible states in this theory. Mixed states are  inadmissible and cannot  be  allowed to
occur.  (By  writing  things  this  way  it  might  appear  that  we  regard  the Qi  and  |Ci>  as  constituting  discreet,
denumerably infinite sets. This is, of course,  not the case. Both are, properly, to be regarded  as continua as is
the set of inadmissible states. This notation is just simpler to work with.)
There  should  be  no  segregation  of  consciousness  into  any set  of  individual  observers.  We  will  just
designate it Q(t). This will prevent us from trying to describe the world in terms of separable and independent
"wave functions," one for your brain, my brain, or other things; it would be difficult having to make sense of
trillions of  independent  consciousness  operators.  While it  is  true  that  we  seem  to  experience  our  individual
conscious states independently, we have to argue that this apparent  separateness  is merely an illusion born of
facts like "I" can remember  my memories  but  not  "yours." And  "I" can experience  my sensation of  blue  but
not  "yours." These  facts are  indisputable,  and  surely interesting. But  they only obscure  matters  if we wish to
study the problem at hand. And we do not want to be misinterpreted as proposing anything mystical here. The
important  point  is  mathematical—we  will  regard  consciousness  (in  its  totality)  as  something  that  can  be
indexed by a single parameter t. (This also disposes of the Wigner's Friend paradox.)
If C is to be regarded  as any sort  of operator  at all (in the normal mathematical sense) we could well
encounter  difficulties.  Consider  <Ya|C|Yb>  supposing  that  Ya  and  Yb  are  eigenstates  of  C  corresponding  to
two  different  qualia  states  Qa and  Qb.  Imagine  C  to  be  Hermitian—like  a  normal  measurement  operator
should be.  Now,  unless qualia are strange and behave,  effectively, like zero,  we would  have to conclude  that
Ya  and Yb  must  be orthogonal.  This would  prove  fatal (vide infra).  We would  be much better  off denying C
the  status  of  any  kind  of  operator,  calling it  a  pseudo-operator  instead.  If  Ya  and  Yb  have  different  qualia
eigenvalues  we  can  say  little  about  their  linear  combinations.  Are  these  mixed  states?  Are  they eigenstates
corresponding to Qa  or Qb  or some completely different qualia state? Who knows? A very important point to
bear  in mind is that  two  state  vectors,  in this theory, do  not  have to  be  orthogonal  in order  to  correspond  to
completely different qualia eigenvalues. We will, somewhat  carelessly, use the terms 'eigenvector' and eigen-
space' in connection with C but it should never be thought that we mistake it for a real operator.
Regarding  the  nature  of  the  |Ci>s  one  thing  is  obvious;  they  are  highly degenerate  with  respect  to
the Qi. It would, for instance, make no difference to the overall state of consciousness whether an electron had
been  created  in a  region with no  observers.  And  we  must  recognize  a  sort  of  null state  of  consciousness—a
state  where  there  just  aren't  any sentient observers  at  all. (The  state  vector  a  few seconds  after  the big bang
would  correspond  to  such a state.  So would  many others.)  So we must  picture  our  Fock space  as broken  up
into  many  separate  subspaces,  some  with  a  particular  Qi  that  designates  the  unique  conscious  experience
corresponding to it, and others corresponding to no definite experience at all. 
The time variable that appears in |Y(t)> and Q(t) requires a comment.  As it pertains to the former case
it causes no problems with relativity since the equations that determine the evolution of |Y(t)> are, themselves,
relativistically invariant—t only represents  an arbitrary choice of Lorentz frame.  Q(t)  might cause  a problem,
however.  By  choosing  not  to  regard  consciousness  as  broken  up  into  separate  observers  (each  of  which
needing to be assigned its own proper  time) we have more-or-less  forced ourselves to select a particular set of
space-like  hypersurfaces  to  designate  the  various  't's.  Now  perhaps  because  consciousness  is  a  non-material
sort  of  thing  such  a  violation of  relativity is  permissible—we  can't  be  sure  how  physics treats  non-material
things.  But  it  is  essential  that  we  construe  Q(t)  in  such  a  way  as  to  end  up  with  no  physical  violations  of
relativity.
The Evolution of these States with Time.
Taking  no  account  of  consciousness  we  could  picture  |Y(t)>  evolving  according  to  ä
¶t È Y HtL > = H ' HtL È Y HtL >  where  H '  designates  the  interaction  operator  for  our  world.  (H'(t)  =
Ù H ' Hx, tL â3 x where H' (x,t) is the corresponding Hamiltonian density operator).  We assume normal ordering.
All operators  and state vectors  are being represented  in the Dirac Interaction Picture.  There would,  in conse-
quence,  exist a unitary operator,  U(t2, t1),  having the property that |Y(t2)> = U(t2, t1) |Y(t1)> . Let us imagine
the world  at  time t1  being in a  definite state  of  consciousness.  Now  the |Ci> are  in no  necessary way eigen-
states of the Hamiltonian. So things could  quickly evolve into a situation where we have some probability of
finding the conscious state of the world in any of quite a number  of configurations. But this is never what we
seem to experience;  our  common  awareness  appears  unconfused  and composed  of a well-defined succession
of qualia. Reality will only tolerate definite states of consciousness– that  is to say |Y(t)> must always lie within
one of the eigenspaces of C. 
We  can  arrange  for  this  to  happen  by  amending  the  previous  equation  for  the  time-evolution
of È YHtL >  to  also  require  S È Y HtL > = ÈY(t)  >  where  S  is  a  (non-linear)  operator  having  some  interesting
properties:
2)   If  |Y(t)> is an eigenstate of C it does nothing. The state is completely unaffected.
3)   If  |Y(t)> is not an eigenstate of C it will look at all the amplitudes <Ci|Y(t)> for every existing <Ci| (that is
to say every eigenstate of C). It will square  these amplitudes  and,  using these values as relative  probabilities,
convert  |Y(t)> into one of the |Ci> at random.
S  functions  as  a  projection  operator  taking  mixed  states  (with  respect  to  C)  into  definite  states  of
consciousness. We give up the idea of a unitary time-evolution operator.  Such an operator  has an inverse. We
cannot  go  backwards  in time according  to  S  since the decision how to  go  forward  is made  at  random.  This
imparts a natural directionality to time. S2  = S and S has no explicit time dependence.  Since |Y(t)> is always
an eigenstate of C we may write C |Y(t)> = Q(t) |Y(t)>. The qualia-state is assumed independent of phase so, if
|Y(t)>  corresponds  to  a  particular  Qi,  ãä Θ  |Y(t)>  will  correspond  to  it  also.  We  suppose  that  C  |0>  =  Φ  |0>
where Φ designates the null state of consciousness. 
As a matter  of practical fact, I tend to believe that  |Y(t)> usually evolves rather seamlessly, and with-
out great need for S, passing more-or-less continuously from one eigenstate of C into another. (But experimen-
tal physics can easily complicate things.)
It is worthwhile to consider the difference between the present idea and Chalmers' M-property theory.
Chalmers  appears  to  regard  his  M-operator  (which  measures  consciousness)  as  behaving  like  any standard
measuring operator  in textbook quantum mechanics. It seems to play an active role in projecting the state into
one  of  its  eigenstates.  Since  the  M-property  here  is  the  qualia  state  of  the  system it  plays a  role  somewhat
analogous to  that of our  C. But  for  us C plays not so much  an active as a "permissive" role– it  distinguishes
admissible  state  vectors  from  inadmissible  ones.  Here  is  a  picturesque  metaphor:  We  are  accustomed  to
thinking of  the Fock space  in which our  reality lives as something like an infinitely extended,  infinite-dimen-
sional block of  Cheddar  cheese.  We,  instead,  picture  it more  like a  block of  Swiss cheese– it is full of holes.
The  cheese  contains  the  state  vectors  that  represent  definite  states  of  consciousness.  The  holes  contain  the
mixed states. Ordinarily |Y(t)> evolves, under the action of U, so as to remain inside the cheese. S does noth-
ing at all. But sometimes (perhaps due to the intervention of experimental physicists) it tries to move into one
of the holes. At the instant it does this S corrects  the situation by projecting it back into the cheese. But S is a
rather  lazy  operator. È < Y1 È Y2 > È2  is  a  sort  of  measure  of  how  similar  two  state  vectors  are.  If  they  are
identical it  is 1.  If they are  quite  different  it  is zero  or  very small.  S  tries  to  project  the  errant  state  into the
most similar states available in the cheese. Hence the Born rule. (I suppose  it might have elected to do things
differently. But  that  is  just  how  physics works.)  This  idea  would  run  into  serious  trouble  if  the  state  vector
were to evolve into a |Y(t)> that existed in the "cheese" but was about  to enter a "hole" if |Y(t)> was orthogo-
nal to every other |Ci>. S would have no choice but to project the state back into itself and reality would hang
up  there  forever.  Since the universe seems  to  have been evolving successfully for  about  14  billion years, we
assume that our "Swiss cheese" is so densely packed with |Ci>s that this situation never arises.
It  might  be  objected  that  our  "fiducial  time"  violates  relativity  by  introducing  a  preferred  Lorentz
frame. It does do this, of course,  but only in relation to qualia. We are Property Dualists and do not think that
qualia  are,  in  any  sense,  physical  things.  We  believe  that  they  can  violate  relativity as  much  as  they  want
provided  that  no  physically observable  contradictions  of  relativity result.  Since we  have  assigned conscious-
ness  only a  permissive  (as  opposed  to  active)  role,  we  do  not  see  a  problem  here.  I  think it  would  be  very
difficult to use this idea to construct  any physical experiment that would show a violation of relativity. (But it
is hard to prove a negative.)
Consciousness18.nb  3
Taking  no  account  of  consciousness  we  could  picture  |Y(t)>  evolving  according  to  ä
¶t È Y HtL > = H ' HtL È Y HtL >  where  H '  designates  the  interaction  operator  for  our  world.  (H'(t)  =
Ù H ' Hx, tL â3 x where H' (x,t) is the corresponding Hamiltonian density operator).  We assume normal ordering.
All operators  and state vectors  are being represented  in the Dirac Interaction Picture.  There would,  in conse-
quence,  exist a unitary operator,  U(t2, t1),  having the property that |Y(t2)> = U(t2, t1) |Y(t1)> . Let us imagine
the world  at  time t1  being in a  definite state  of  consciousness.  Now  the |Ci> are  in no  necessary way eigen-
states of the Hamiltonian. So things could  quickly evolve into a situation where we have some probability of
finding the conscious state of the world in any of quite a number  of configurations. But this is never what we
seem to experience;  our  common  awareness  appears  unconfused  and composed  of a well-defined succession
of qualia. Reality will only tolerate definite states of consciousness– that  is to say |Y(t)> must always lie within
one of the eigenspaces of C. 
We  can  arrange  for  this  to  happen  by  amending  the  previous  equation  for  the  time-evolution
of È YHtL >  to  also  require  S È Y HtL > = ÈY(t)  >  where  S  is  a  (non-linear)  operator  having  some  interesting
properties:
2)   If  |Y(t)> is an eigenstate of C it does nothing. The state is completely unaffected.
3)   If  |Y(t)> is not an eigenstate of C it will look at all the amplitudes <Ci|Y(t)> for every existing <Ci| (that is
to say every eigenstate of C). It will square  these amplitudes  and,  using these values as relative  probabilities,
convert  |Y(t)> into one of the |Ci> at random.
S  functions  as  a  projection  operator  taking  mixed  states  (with  respect  to  C)  into  definite  states  of
consciousness. We give up the idea of a unitary time-evolution operator.  Such an operator  has an inverse. We
cannot  go  backwards  in time according  to  S  since the decision how to  go  forward  is made  at  random.  This
imparts a natural directionality to time. S2  = S and S has no explicit time dependence.  Since |Y(t)> is always
an eigenstate of C we may write C |Y(t)> = Q(t) |Y(t)>. The qualia-state is assumed independent of phase so, if
|Y(t)>  corresponds  to  a  particular  Qi,  ãä Θ  |Y(t)>  will  correspond  to  it  also.  We  suppose  that  C  |0>  =  Φ  |0>
where Φ designates the null state of consciousness. 
As a matter  of practical fact, I tend to believe that  |Y(t)> usually evolves rather seamlessly, and with-
out great need for S, passing more-or-less continuously from one eigenstate of C into another. (But experimen-
tal physics can easily complicate things.)
It is worthwhile to consider the difference between the present idea and Chalmers' M-property theory.
Chalmers  appears  to  regard  his  M-operator  (which  measures  consciousness)  as  behaving  like  any standard
measuring operator  in textbook quantum mechanics. It seems to play an active role in projecting the state into
one  of  its  eigenstates.  Since  the  M-property  here  is  the  qualia  state  of  the  system it  plays a  role  somewhat
analogous to  that of our  C. But  for  us C plays not so much  an active as a "permissive" role– it  distinguishes
admissible  state  vectors  from  inadmissible  ones.  Here  is  a  picturesque  metaphor:  We  are  accustomed  to
thinking of  the Fock space  in which our  reality lives as something like an infinitely extended,  infinite-dimen-
sional block of  Cheddar  cheese.  We,  instead,  picture  it more  like a  block of  Swiss cheese– it is full of holes.
The  cheese  contains  the  state  vectors  that  represent  definite  states  of  consciousness.  The  holes  contain  the
mixed states. Ordinarily |Y(t)> evolves, under the action of U, so as to remain inside the cheese. S does noth-
ing at all. But sometimes (perhaps due to the intervention of experimental physicists) it tries to move into one
of the holes. At the instant it does this S corrects  the situation by projecting it back into the cheese. But S is a
rather  lazy  operator. È < Y1 È Y2 > È2  is  a  sort  of  measure  of  how  similar  two  state  vectors  are.  If  they  are
identical it  is 1.  If they are  quite  different  it  is zero  or  very small.  S  tries  to  project  the  errant  state  into the
most similar states available in the cheese. Hence the Born rule. (I suppose  it might have elected to do things
differently. But  that  is  just  how  physics works.)  This  idea  would  run  into  serious  trouble  if  the  state  vector
were to evolve into a |Y(t)> that existed in the "cheese" but was about  to enter a "hole" if |Y(t)> was orthogo-
nal to every other |Ci>. S would have no choice but to project the state back into itself and reality would hang
up  there  forever.  Since the universe seems  to  have been evolving successfully for  about  14  billion years, we
assume that our "Swiss cheese" is so densely packed with |Ci>s that this situation never arises.
It  might  be  objected  that  our  "fiducial  time"  violates  relativity  by  introducing  a  preferred  Lorentz
frame. It does do this, of course,  but only in relation to qualia. We are Property Dualists and do not think that
qualia  are,  in  any  sense,  physical  things.  We  believe  that  they  can  violate  relativity as  much  as  they  want
provided  that  no  physically observable  contradictions  of  relativity result.  Since we  have  assigned conscious-
ness  only a  permissive  (as  opposed  to  active)  role,  we  do  not  see  a  problem  here.  I  think it  would  be  very
difficult to use this idea to construct  any physical experiment that would show a violation of relativity. (But it
is hard to prove a negative.)
The Anatomy of a Measurement.
Consider  a  very simple experiment  in which an electron is sent through a Stern-Gerlach  apparatus.  It can be
prepared  as either spin-up or spin-down or in any superposition of these states. If it comes in spin-up it always
veers up and strikes a detector  that causes a light, originally blue, to shine green. If it is down it goes the other
way and a red light is triggered. This device, the electron whose spin it measures, and an observer, constitute a
physical universe  described  by |Y(t)>.  The  conscious  states  of  this  universe,  we  will imagine,  belong  to  this
single observer  whose only possible states of awareness  are 1)  seeing a green color,  2)  seeing a red  color,  or
3)  seeing  a  blue  color.  So  the  space  in  which  the  conscious  state  of  the  universe  is  a  vector  contains  three
subspaces– one  corresponding  to  each  of  the  above  possibilities.  These  are  the  eigenspaces  defined  by  C.
Since this world is simple we think that we can get away with describing it in a simple manner. Let us describe
its initial state as |Y(0)>  = |+, B> where + says that our  electron is spin-up.  'B' simply says that the rest of the
measurement  system (observer  and all) are in their initial state. C|Y(0)>  = B |Y(0)>  since we imagine the light
is  blue  before  any  measurement  is  made.  When  the  spin-up  electron  is  detected  at  td  |Y(0)>  evolves  into
|Y(td)>  which  we  can  write  as  |+,  G>.  C|Y( td)>  =  G  |Y( td)>  meaning  that  this  new  state  is  an  eigenvector
corresponding  to  the qualia 'seeing a green color.'  (If the election had been spin-down we would  have ended
up with a red  qualia and a state |-, R>.)  If things happen to start  out  as (|+, B> + |-, B>)/ 2 our  system will,
obviously, evolve into a superposition of states which is no longer an eigenvector of C. Since, according to the
above-mentioned  principle, reality cannot tolerate any state that is not an eigenstate of Cit is necessary that S
project  |Y( td)>  into either  |+, G> or  |-,  R> with 50% probability. Let us make it clear that no wave function
collapses.  Instead,  a  state  vector  |Y(t)>– which is  not  a  function  of  the  spatial  coordinates  (x,  y,  z)– tries  to
evolve into a state (in Fock space) where it no longer resides entirely within a particular Ci but rather exists as
a superposition of 'red' and 'green' qualia states. S immediately corrects this by projecting |Y(t)> back into only
one of the two definite states of consciousness available to it.
There  is something  a  little awkward  about  such  a  phenomenon.  And  it  is  not  obvious  that  adjoining
consciousness  to  the  problem  by way of  S  does  much  to  improve  things. Everett  elects  to  throw  out  S  and
freely  allow  non-definite  states  of  consciousness.  These  are,  presumably,  able  to  sort  themselves  out  into
separate,  conscious  worlds.  Clever  as  the  Relative-State  Interpretation  is,  it  suffers  from  a  serious  problem.
Suppose  that the electron is sent out in such a state that the green light should illuminate 99% of the time and
the red one only 1%. I know perfectly well that, in situations like this, I will see the green light almost all the
time.  But  one  cannot  be  "just  a  little  bit  conscious."  One  either  is  or  one  isn't.  If  there  are  two  conscious
"observers"– one seeing  green  and  one  seeing  red– there ought,  really,  to  be  a  50/50  chance  of  "my" being
either.  In fact,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  a  satisfactory solution to  this inconsistency (6).  For  this reason  we
will  want  to  reject  the  Everett  Interpretation  and  not  burden  ourselves  with  the  uneconomical  existence  of
realities we can have no contact with or knowledge of. 
4  Consciousness18.nb
Consider  a  very simple experiment  in which an electron is sent through a Stern-Gerlach  apparatus.  It can be
prepared  as either spin-up or spin-down or in any superposition of these states. If it comes in spin-up it always
veers up and strikes a detector  that causes a light, originally blue, to shine green. If it is down it goes the other
way and a red light is triggered. This device, the electron whose spin it measures, and an observer, constitute a
physical universe  described  by |Y(t)>.  The  conscious  states  of  this  universe,  we  will imagine,  belong  to  this
single observer  whose only possible states of awareness  are 1)  seeing a green color,  2)  seeing a red  color,  or
3)  seeing  a  blue  color.  So  the  space  in  which  the  conscious  state  of  the  universe  is  a  vector  contains  three
subspaces– one  corresponding  to  each  of  the  above  possibilities.  These  are  the  eigenspaces  defined  by  C.
Since this world is simple we think that we can get away with describing it in a simple manner. Let us describe
its initial state as |Y(0)>  = |+, B> where + says that our  electron is spin-up.  'B' simply says that the rest of the
measurement  system (observer  and all) are in their initial state. C|Y(0)>  = B |Y(0)>  since we imagine the light
is  blue  before  any  measurement  is  made.  When  the  spin-up  electron  is  detected  at  td  |Y(0)>  evolves  into
|Y(td)>  which  we  can  write  as  |+,  G>.  C|Y( td)>  =  G  |Y( td)>  meaning  that  this  new  state  is  an  eigenvector
corresponding  to  the qualia 'seeing a green color.'  (If the election had been spin-down we would  have ended
up with a red  qualia and a state |-, R>.)  If things happen to start  out  as (|+, B> + |-, B>)/ 2 our  system will,
obviously, evolve into a superposition of states which is no longer an eigenvector of C. Since, according to the
above-mentioned  principle, reality cannot tolerate any state that is not an eigenstate of Cit is necessary that S
project  |Y( td)>  into either  |+, G> or  |-,  R> with 50% probability. Let us make it clear that no wave function
collapses.  Instead,  a  state  vector  |Y(t)>– which is  not  a  function  of  the  spatial  coordinates  (x,  y,  z)– tries  to
evolve into a state (in Fock space) where it no longer resides entirely within a particular Ci but rather exists as
a superposition of 'red' and 'green' qualia states. S immediately corrects this by projecting |Y(t)> back into only
one of the two definite states of consciousness available to it.
There  is something  a  little awkward  about  such  a  phenomenon.  And  it  is  not  obvious  that  adjoining
consciousness  to  the  problem  by way of  S  does  much  to  improve  things. Everett  elects  to  throw  out  S  and
freely  allow  non-definite  states  of  consciousness.  These  are,  presumably,  able  to  sort  themselves  out  into
separate,  conscious  worlds.  Clever  as  the  Relative-State  Interpretation  is,  it  suffers  from  a  serious  problem.
Suppose  that the electron is sent out in such a state that the green light should illuminate 99% of the time and
the red one only 1%. I know perfectly well that, in situations like this, I will see the green light almost all the
time.  But  one  cannot  be  "just  a  little  bit  conscious."  One  either  is  or  one  isn't.  If  there  are  two  conscious
"observers"– one seeing  green  and  one  seeing  red– there ought,  really,  to  be  a  50/50  chance  of  "my" being
either.  In fact,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  a  satisfactory solution to  this inconsistency (6).  For  this reason  we
will  want  to  reject  the  Everett  Interpretation  and  not  burden  ourselves  with  the  uneconomical  existence  of
realities we can have no contact with or knowledge of. 
The Quantum Zeno Effect.
Since S measures the state vector constantly (7) a concern may arise regarding the quantum Zeno effect (8); if
the  state  is  always being  observed  can  it  really ever  go  from  blue  to  green  or  red?  This  problem  has  been
discussed carefully by Chalmers in his consideration of M-properties.  
Consider a spin-up  electron moving through the Stern-Gerlach  apparatus  but  still far  from the detec-
tor.  |Y(t)>  will, of  course,  be  changing. But  it  will always remain  one  of  the  many B eigenstates  and  S  will
affect  it  in  no  way.  As  the  electron  moves  along  toward  the  detector,  a  very  frequent  measurement  of  its
position might,  indeed,  stop  it  somewhat  from  moving.  But  a  very frequent  measurement  of  the blueness  of
the light will not affect its motion whatsoever.  (It is true that  |Y(t)> changes discontinuously at td. But this is
not strange. It is just a consequence of the simplistic way in which we imagined our experiment.)
At  td  it  encounters  the  measuring  device.  |Y(td)>  is  now  an  eigenstate  of  C  having  a  green  qualia.
Throughout this entire process S, for all its observing, has done not a single thing to the state vector. Now, if
the  electron  had  been  in a  superposed  state  when  it  hit  the  detector,  S,  at  td,  would  have  immediately pro-
jected  things into either  of  the  two  possible  outcomes.  But,  still there  is no  Zeno  effect  to  be  noticed  in the
process.  Why? S  measures  things  all  the  time  but,  as  things  proceed  along  here,  |Y(t)>  always  remains  an
eigenstate of C. 
Now  real  measurements  do  not,  of  course,  occur  instantaneously. Perhaps  the  devil is  in the  details.
Say the electron is spin-up. Set td  = 0 and suppose that the measurement  is complete at Dt.  Suppose Dt  is very
small and that we can approximate  the state vector's evolution as linear. We can write |Y(t)> » [(1 -  t/Dt)  YB
+ (t/Dt)  YG]/N (where  N is just for normalization).  Are these intervening states mixed, as they would have to
be in Chalmers' theory? We can't say. Maybe, as long as t < Dt/2,  the state is still a blue eigenstate. At exactly
Dt/2  it  becomes  a  green  one.  (|Y(t)> may change  continuously but  Q(t)  might not  for  all we  know.  I  do  not
think we can even say what continuity means for qualia.)  Or,  maybe, after t = 0,  it takes a little time (Dt)  for
the  blue  light's filament  to  cool  down  and  for  the  red  one's  to  heat  up?  At  t  =  Dt/2  the  observer  would  be
seeing both  some  blue  and  red  light. Perhaps  this is what  is going on.  Anyway, we  can easily construe  C  in
such a way as to have no problems with Zeno. Things are very different if we consider (|+, G> + |-, R>)/ 2 ,
the state that would try to arise if we sent a half-up/half-down electron into our apparatus.  There is plainly no
way  for  this  state  to  be  anything but  mixed.  It  will  immediately  be  projected  back  into  the  "cheese."  This
would happen the moment |Y(t)> tried to enter the "hole." 
As a general matter,  say that |Y(td)> is just about  to enter a "hole." <Y(td)|Y(td)> = 1 at this time so it
might seem as if S would have to project it back into itself. Not at all. Suppose there was another eigenstate of
C, |F>,  that was such that <F |Y(td)> = .999.  This is altogether possible and |F>  might even correspond  to an
entirely different qualia eigenstate than |Y(td)>. There would now be an almost equal probability of projection
into either state. (There might even be 1000  such F-type  eigenstates!) This would be impossible if C were an
actual  Hermitian  operator  since,  then,  the  |Ci>  would  constitute  a  complete  orthonormal  basis  for  the  Fock
space.  But  we  are  proposing  nothing of  the  sort  and  the  various  squared  amplitudes  must  be  interpreted  as
relative, not absolute, probabilities. 
Chalmers'  problem  stems  from  his  taking M  literally as  a  Hermitian operator.  He  appears  to  reason
somewhat  as  follows: If  |Y(0)>  is  an  eigenstate  of  M  corresponding  to  the  blue  qualia  and  M  measures  the
state vector at t = Ε it will find it almost entirely in |Y(0)>. In particular, at Ε << ΤZ  (where ΤZ  is the Zeno time
for the system (8)),  |Y(Ε)> = mostly |Y(0)> + small bit |orthogonal state>. He seems to assume that this orthog-
onal  state  could  not  correspond  to  a  blue  qualia  so  that  if M  measured  'blue'  at  Ε  it  would  project  the  state
vector right back into |Y(0)> and nothing else. This is certainly not the case in our theory (and not necessarily
in his either since the orthogonal state could be a blue eigenstate too). But for |Y(Ε)> to correspond to a 'green'
qualia state (vide supra) would be impossible in his theory since < Y(0)|Y(Ε)> is not going to be very different
from 1 and |Y(Ε)> cannot  therefore  have a different qualia eigenvalue than  |Y(0)> assuming M is Hermitian.
Of  course,  this  is  not  a  problem  for  our  theory.  We  allow two  eigenstates  corresponding  to  different  qualia
eigenvalues to be non-orthogonal. 
A  bigger  problem  both  Chalmers'  theory and  this one  might seem  to  face  is why the  quantum  Zeno
effect can be demonstrated  at all; it is, indisputably, a real thing. Excited beryllium ions have been prevented
from decaying by pulsing them frequently with light to detect if they are still in their original state (9). This is a
perfectly valid experiment since measuring the ion as excited completely precludes any possibility of its being
decayed.  But  the  rate  of  testing of  the  ion  (as  fast  as  250  times/sec)  greatly exceeds  what  any human  brain
could  consciously process.  It  appears  that  human  consciousness  cannot  be  affecting the  ion.  Is  the  detector
supposed to be conscious too?
We need to consider this process more carefully. For simplicity let us suppose the detector makes only
two measurements,  one at T and one at 2 T. T is very small relative to the rate of decay. Initially the ion is in
its undecayed state (U) and the detector  is still in its initial state (I). We will write its state vector as |U, I>. At
time T  the  first measurement  is made.  Consciousness  notices  nothing and  nothing projects.  But  the  detector
records its activities on a strip of magnetic tape. The state is now Α |U, I, I> + Β |D, I, A> (where A means the
detector has registered a decay and Α >> Β). At 2 T another measurement  is made. The state now becomes Α2
|U, I,  I,  I>  +  Α  Β  |D,  I,  I,  A>  +  Β  |D,  I,  A,  A>.  Everything, the  tape  included,  is still in superposition.  Now
consciousness  looks  at  it.  It  wants  to  know the probability of  finding |U, I,  I,  I>  i.e.  that  the particle  has not
decayed.  This  is É Α2 È2  which  is  exactly what  it  would  have  been  had  the  measurements  actually projected
(collapsed)  the state.  Had that been the case  the probability of U at T would  be È Α È2  and at  2  T it would  be
È Α È4  which is the same as that obtained  above.  The decay is inhibited just as Zeno would  have it. Although
they might seem  to  do  nothing, the measurements  have altered  the trajectory of  the state  vector  through  our
Fock space. If they had not been performed the system would have evolved differently.
Consciousness18.nb  5
Since S measures the state vector constantly (7) a concern may arise regarding the quantum Zeno effect (8); if
the  state  is  always being  observed  can  it  really ever  go  from  blue  to  green  or  red?  This  problem  has  been
discussed carefully by Chalmers in his consideration of M-properties.  
Consider a spin-up  electron moving through the Stern-Gerlach  apparatus  but  still far  from the detec-
tor.  |Y(t)>  will, of  course,  be  changing. But  it  will always remain  one  of  the  many B eigenstates  and  S  will
affect  it  in  no  way.  As  the  electron  moves  along  toward  the  detector,  a  very  frequent  measurement  of  its
position might,  indeed,  stop  it  somewhat  from  moving.  But  a  very frequent  measurement  of  the blueness  of
the light will not affect its motion whatsoever.  (It is true that  |Y(t)> changes discontinuously at td. But this is
not strange. It is just a consequence of the simplistic way in which we imagined our experiment.)
At  td  it  encounters  the  measuring  device.  |Y(td)>  is  now  an  eigenstate  of  C  having  a  green  qualia.
Throughout this entire process S, for all its observing, has done not a single thing to the state vector. Now, if
the  electron  had  been  in a  superposed  state  when  it  hit  the  detector,  S,  at  td,  would  have  immediately pro-
jected  things into either  of  the  two  possible  outcomes.  But,  still there  is no  Zeno  effect  to  be  noticed  in the
process.  Why? S  measures  things  all  the  time  but,  as  things  proceed  along  here,  |Y(t)>  always  remains  an
eigenstate of C. 
Now  real  measurements  do  not,  of  course,  occur  instantaneously. Perhaps  the  devil is  in the  details.
Say the electron is spin-up. Set td  = 0 and suppose that the measurement  is complete at Dt.  Suppose Dt  is very
small and that we can approximate  the state vector's evolution as linear. We can write |Y(t)> » [(1 -  t/Dt)  YB
+ (t/Dt)  YG]/N (where  N is just for normalization).  Are these intervening states mixed, as they would have to
be in Chalmers' theory? We can't say. Maybe, as long as t < Dt/2,  the state is still a blue eigenstate. At exactly
Dt/2  it  becomes  a  green  one.  (|Y(t)> may change  continuously but  Q(t)  might not  for  all we  know.  I  do  not
think we can even say what continuity means for qualia.)  Or,  maybe, after t = 0,  it takes a little time (Dt)  for
the  blue  light's filament  to  cool  down  and  for  the  red  one's  to  heat  up?  At  t  =  Dt/2  the  observer  would  be
seeing both  some  blue  and  red  light. Perhaps  this is what  is going on.  Anyway, we  can easily construe  C  in
such a way as to have no problems with Zeno. Things are very different if we consider (|+, G> + |-, R>)/ 2 ,
the state that would try to arise if we sent a half-up/half-down electron into our apparatus.  There is plainly no
way  for  this  state  to  be  anything but  mixed.  It  will  immediately  be  projected  back  into  the  "cheese."  This
would happen the moment |Y(t)> tried to enter the "hole." 
As a general matter,  say that |Y(td)> is just about  to enter a "hole." <Y(td)|Y(td)> = 1 at this time so it
might seem as if S would have to project it back into itself. Not at all. Suppose there was another eigenstate of
C, |F>,  that was such that <F |Y(td)> = .999.  This is altogether possible and |F>  might even correspond  to an
entirely different qualia eigenstate than |Y(td)>. There would now be an almost equal probability of projection
into either state. (There might even be 1000  such F-type  eigenstates!) This would be impossible if C were an
actual  Hermitian  operator  since,  then,  the  |Ci>  would  constitute  a  complete  orthonormal  basis  for  the  Fock
space.  But  we  are  proposing  nothing of  the  sort  and  the  various  squared  amplitudes  must  be  interpreted  as
relative, not absolute, probabilities. 
Chalmers'  problem  stems  from  his  taking M  literally as  a  Hermitian operator.  He  appears  to  reason
somewhat  as  follows: If  |Y(0)>  is  an  eigenstate  of  M  corresponding  to  the  blue  qualia  and  M  measures  the
state vector at t = Ε it will find it almost entirely in |Y(0)>. In particular, at Ε << ΤZ  (where ΤZ  is the Zeno time
for the system (8)),  |Y(Ε)> = mostly |Y(0)> + small bit |orthogonal state>. He seems to assume that this orthog-
onal  state  could  not  correspond  to  a  blue  qualia  so  that  if M  measured  'blue'  at  Ε  it  would  project  the  state
vector right back into |Y(0)> and nothing else. This is certainly not the case in our theory (and not necessarily
in his either since the orthogonal state could be a blue eigenstate too). But for |Y(Ε)> to correspond to a 'green'
qualia state (vide supra) would be impossible in his theory since < Y(0)|Y(Ε)> is not going to be very different
from 1 and |Y(Ε)> cannot  therefore  have a different qualia eigenvalue than  |Y(0)> assuming M is Hermitian.
Of  course,  this  is  not  a  problem  for  our  theory.  We  allow two  eigenstates  corresponding  to  different  qualia
eigenvalues to be non-orthogonal. 
A  bigger  problem  both  Chalmers'  theory and  this one  might seem  to  face  is why the  quantum  Zeno
effect can be demonstrated  at all; it is, indisputably, a real thing. Excited beryllium ions have been prevented
from decaying by pulsing them frequently with light to detect if they are still in their original state (9). This is a
perfectly valid experiment since measuring the ion as excited completely precludes any possibility of its being
decayed.  But  the  rate  of  testing of  the  ion  (as  fast  as  250  times/sec)  greatly exceeds  what  any human  brain
could  consciously process.  It  appears  that  human  consciousness  cannot  be  affecting the  ion.  Is  the  detector
supposed to be conscious too?
We need to consider this process more carefully. For simplicity let us suppose the detector makes only
two measurements,  one at T and one at 2 T. T is very small relative to the rate of decay. Initially the ion is in
its undecayed state (U) and the detector  is still in its initial state (I). We will write its state vector as |U, I>. At
time T  the  first measurement  is made.  Consciousness  notices  nothing and  nothing projects.  But  the  detector
records its activities on a strip of magnetic tape. The state is now Α |U, I, I> + Β |D, I, A> (where A means the
detector has registered a decay and Α >> Β). At 2 T another measurement  is made. The state now becomes Α2
|U, I,  I,  I>  +  Α  Β  |D,  I,  I,  A>  +  Β  |D,  I,  A,  A>.  Everything, the  tape  included,  is still in superposition.  Now
consciousness  looks  at  it.  It  wants  to  know the probability of  finding |U, I,  I,  I>  i.e.  that  the particle  has not
decayed.  This  is É Α2 È2  which  is  exactly what  it  would  have  been  had  the  measurements  actually projected
(collapsed)  the state.  Had that been the case  the probability of U at T would  be È Α È2  and at  2  T it would  be
È Α È4  which is the same as that obtained  above.  The decay is inhibited just as Zeno would  have it. Although
they might seem  to  do  nothing, the measurements  have altered  the trajectory of  the state  vector  through  our
Fock space. If they had not been performed the system would have evolved differently.
6  Consciousness18.nb
Since S measures the state vector constantly (7) a concern may arise regarding the quantum Zeno effect (8); if
the  state  is  always being  observed  can  it  really ever  go  from  blue  to  green  or  red?  This  problem  has  been
discussed carefully by Chalmers in his consideration of M-properties.  
Consider a spin-up  electron moving through the Stern-Gerlach  apparatus  but  still far  from the detec-
tor.  |Y(t)>  will, of  course,  be  changing. But  it  will always remain  one  of  the  many B eigenstates  and  S  will
affect  it  in  no  way.  As  the  electron  moves  along  toward  the  detector,  a  very  frequent  measurement  of  its
position might,  indeed,  stop  it  somewhat  from  moving.  But  a  very frequent  measurement  of  the blueness  of
the light will not affect its motion whatsoever.  (It is true that  |Y(t)> changes discontinuously at td. But this is
not strange. It is just a consequence of the simplistic way in which we imagined our experiment.)
At  td  it  encounters  the  measuring  device.  |Y(td)>  is  now  an  eigenstate  of  C  having  a  green  qualia.
Throughout this entire process S, for all its observing, has done not a single thing to the state vector. Now, if
the  electron  had  been  in a  superposed  state  when  it  hit  the  detector,  S,  at  td,  would  have  immediately pro-
jected  things into either  of  the  two  possible  outcomes.  But,  still there  is no  Zeno  effect  to  be  noticed  in the
process.  Why? S  measures  things  all  the  time  but,  as  things  proceed  along  here,  |Y(t)>  always  remains  an
eigenstate of C. 
Now  real  measurements  do  not,  of  course,  occur  instantaneously. Perhaps  the  devil is  in the  details.
Say the electron is spin-up. Set td  = 0 and suppose that the measurement  is complete at Dt.  Suppose Dt  is very
small and that we can approximate  the state vector's evolution as linear. We can write |Y(t)> » [(1 -  t/Dt)  YB
+ (t/Dt)  YG]/N (where  N is just for normalization).  Are these intervening states mixed, as they would have to
be in Chalmers' theory? We can't say. Maybe, as long as t < Dt/2,  the state is still a blue eigenstate. At exactly
Dt/2  it  becomes  a  green  one.  (|Y(t)> may change  continuously but  Q(t)  might not  for  all we  know.  I  do  not
think we can even say what continuity means for qualia.)  Or,  maybe, after t = 0,  it takes a little time (Dt)  for
the  blue  light's filament  to  cool  down  and  for  the  red  one's  to  heat  up?  At  t  =  Dt/2  the  observer  would  be
seeing both  some  blue  and  red  light. Perhaps  this is what  is going on.  Anyway, we  can easily construe  C  in
such a way as to have no problems with Zeno. Things are very different if we consider (|+, G> + |-, R>)/ 2 ,
the state that would try to arise if we sent a half-up/half-down electron into our apparatus.  There is plainly no
way  for  this  state  to  be  anything but  mixed.  It  will  immediately  be  projected  back  into  the  "cheese."  This
would happen the moment |Y(t)> tried to enter the "hole." 
As a general matter,  say that |Y(td)> is just about  to enter a "hole." <Y(td)|Y(td)> = 1 at this time so it
might seem as if S would have to project it back into itself. Not at all. Suppose there was another eigenstate of
C, |F>,  that was such that <F |Y(td)> = .999.  This is altogether possible and |F>  might even correspond  to an
entirely different qualia eigenstate than |Y(td)>. There would now be an almost equal probability of projection
into either state. (There might even be 1000  such F-type  eigenstates!) This would be impossible if C were an
actual  Hermitian  operator  since,  then,  the  |Ci>  would  constitute  a  complete  orthonormal  basis  for  the  Fock
space.  But  we  are  proposing  nothing of  the  sort  and  the  various  squared  amplitudes  must  be  interpreted  as
relative, not absolute, probabilities. 
Chalmers'  problem  stems  from  his  taking M  literally as  a  Hermitian operator.  He  appears  to  reason
somewhat  as  follows: If  |Y(0)>  is  an  eigenstate  of  M  corresponding  to  the  blue  qualia  and  M  measures  the
state vector at t = Ε it will find it almost entirely in |Y(0)>. In particular, at Ε << ΤZ  (where ΤZ  is the Zeno time
for the system (8)),  |Y(Ε)> = mostly |Y(0)> + small bit |orthogonal state>. He seems to assume that this orthog-
onal  state  could  not  correspond  to  a  blue  qualia  so  that  if M  measured  'blue'  at  Ε  it  would  project  the  state
vector right back into |Y(0)> and nothing else. This is certainly not the case in our theory (and not necessarily
in his either since the orthogonal state could be a blue eigenstate too). But for |Y(Ε)> to correspond to a 'green'
qualia state (vide supra) would be impossible in his theory since < Y(0)|Y(Ε)> is not going to be very different
from 1 and |Y(Ε)> cannot  therefore  have a different qualia eigenvalue than  |Y(0)> assuming M is Hermitian.
Of  course,  this  is  not  a  problem  for  our  theory.  We  allow two  eigenstates  corresponding  to  different  qualia
eigenvalues to be non-orthogonal. 
A  bigger  problem  both  Chalmers'  theory and  this one  might seem  to  face  is why the  quantum  Zeno
effect can be demonstrated  at all; it is, indisputably, a real thing. Excited beryllium ions have been prevented
from decaying by pulsing them frequently with light to detect if they are still in their original state (9). This is a
perfectly valid experiment since measuring the ion as excited completely precludes any possibility of its being
decayed.  But  the  rate  of  testing of  the  ion  (as  fast  as  250  times/sec)  greatly exceeds  what  any human  brain
could  consciously process.  It  appears  that  human  consciousness  cannot  be  affecting the  ion.  Is  the  detector
supposed to be conscious too?
We need to consider this process more carefully. For simplicity let us suppose the detector makes only
two measurements,  one at T and one at 2 T. T is very small relative to the rate of decay. Initially the ion is in
its undecayed state (U) and the detector  is still in its initial state (I). We will write its state vector as |U, I>. At
time T  the  first measurement  is made.  Consciousness  notices  nothing and  nothing projects.  But  the  detector
records its activities on a strip of magnetic tape. The state is now Α |U, I, I> + Β |D, I, A> (where A means the
detector has registered a decay and Α >> Β). At 2 T another measurement  is made. The state now becomes Α2
|U, I,  I,  I>  +  Α  Β  |D,  I,  I,  A>  +  Β  |D,  I,  A,  A>.  Everything, the  tape  included,  is still in superposition.  Now
consciousness  looks  at  it.  It  wants  to  know the probability of  finding |U, I,  I,  I>  i.e.  that  the particle  has not
decayed.  This  is É Α2 È2  which  is  exactly what  it  would  have  been  had  the  measurements  actually projected
(collapsed)  the state.  Had that been the case  the probability of U at T would  be È Α È2  and at  2  T it would  be
È Α È4  which is the same as that obtained  above.  The decay is inhibited just as Zeno would  have it. Although
they might seem  to  do  nothing, the measurements  have altered  the trajectory of  the state  vector  through  our
Fock space. If they had not been performed the system would have evolved differently.
Conclusion.
By replacing wave functions with states in Fock space, |Y(t)>, we have created an interpretive picture that is in
better agreement with the view adopted  by physics since the inception of modern  field theory in the 1950s.  A
price to be paid for this "better agreement" is the acceptance  of a unitary view of consciousness in which the
idea  of  individual  observers  is  ignored.  Peculiar  as  this  may seem,  it  does  not  bring  with  it  any observable
consequences.  But  it  allows us  to  refer  to  an instantaneous  consciousness-state  (qualia-state)  of  the universe
as Q(t).  We have to  do  this if we want  to  put  such a state  into relation with |Y(t)>.  Central to  the success  of
this approach  is the realization that C is, in fact, not an operator  in any quantum mechanical sense; rather, it is
a  'classifier'  that  sorts  the  |Y(t)>s  into  admissible  and  inadmissible  states.  This  theory  preserves  a  role  for
consciousness in quantum measurement but a slightly different one from that it plays in M-property theory.
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